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D URING the first session of the 104th Congress, the United States Senate Judiciary Committee approved Senate Bill 956, a proposal to split the United States Court of Appeals for the 
Ninth Circuit. The measure would have established a new 1\velfth Circuit 
consisting of Alaska, Arizona, Idaho, Montana, Nevada, Oregon, and 
Washington and would have left California, Hawaii, Guam, and the 
Northern Mariana Islands in the Ninth Circuit. This vote may appear 
insignificant; however, it could actually have had enormous 
consequences. 
Congress has divided appeals courts only twice since creating the mod-
em appellate system in 1891. Neither House of Congress had ever held 
floor debate on a bill that would split the Ninth Circuit. The court divi-
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sion which Congress considered would have had substantial systemic im-
pacts by, for example, eliminating the finest circuit in which to 
experiment with effective procedures for improving the quality of appel-
late justice. 
The recommended bifurcation would have adversely affected the pro-
posed Ninth Circuit. Most significant, the court would have had compar-
atively few judges to resolve a large, complicated docket and would have 
essentially become a one-state circuit. This is unprecedented. The divi-
sion would also have had important implications for the new Twelfth Cir-
cuit. For instance, the court's creation could have entailed significant 
start-up costs and continuing expenses. Some of these difficulties appar-
ently persuaded the Senate not to split the court, but to authorize a com-
mission which would have assessed the appeals courts. The 104th 
Congress ultimately failed to approve that study; however; it did appro-
priate funds for this effort. Advocates of the Ninth Circuit's division and 
of a national study commission have suggested that they will introduce 
proposals which would implement their views in the 105th Congress. 
The above ideas show that the circuit-splitting measure which the 104th 
Congress considered deserves evaluation. This Essay undertakes that ef-
fort. It first examines the history of Senate Bill 956. The Essay then ana-
lyzes the recent proposal, finding that the measure's disadvantages 
outnumber its benefits. In conclusion, the Essay recommends that Con-
gress reject the proposal and establish a national commission to assess the 
appeals courts and their expanding caseloads. If Congress is not con-
vinced that splitting the Ninth Circuit is unwise and finds that the division 
is imperative, the Essay affords suggestions for improving the bill. 
I. THE BACKGROUND OF SENATE BILL 956 
The bill's background requires limited treatment here, as its history has 
been fully assessed elsewhere.1 Congress instituted the modem appellate 
system by passing the Evarts Act in 1891.2 Congress formed a newly-
numbered Ninth Circuit consisting of California, Nevada, and Oregon in 
18663 and later added Montana, Washington, Idaho, Hawaii, Alaska, Ari-
zona, Guam, and the Northern Mariana Islands.4 
1. See Carl Tobias, The Impoverished Idea of Circuit-Splitting, 44 EMORY L.J. 1357 
(1995); see also Thomas E. Baker, On Redrawing Circuit Boundaries-Why the Proposal to 
Divide the United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit Is Not Such a Good Idea, 22 
ARIZ. ST. L.J. 917 (1990) (hereinafter Baker, Redrawing]. I rely substantially in this Essay 
on these two articles and on THOMAS E. BAKER, RATIONING JUSTICE ON APPEAL (1994) 
(hereinafter BAKER, RATIONING]. 
2. Evarts Act, ch. 517, 26 Stat. 826 (1891) (codified as amended at 28 U.S.C. §§ 41-49 
(1994)). See generally FELIX FRANKFURTER & JAMES M. LANDIS, THE BUSINESS OF THE 
SUPREME CoURT, A STUDY IN THE FEDERAL JUDICIAL SYSTEM 103-28 (1927). 
3. See Act of July 23, 1866, ch. 210, § 2, 14 Stat. 209 (codified as amended at 28 U.S.C. 
§ 41 (1994)). 
4. For the acts adding each state and territory, see Tobias, supra note 1, at 1359-60. 
With the exception of the Northern Mariana Islands version, which is at 28 U.S.C. § 1821 
(1994), each act's current version is at 28 U.S.C. § 41 (1994). 
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Congress has redrawn circuit boundaries only once since 1930.5 Con-
cerns about caseload congestion led Congress in 1980 to create the Elev-
enth Circuit by removing Alabama, Florida, and Georgia from the Fifth 
Circuit, leaving Louisiana, Mississippi, and Texas.6 Congress divided the 
Fifth Circuit partly at the suggestion of the Commission on Revision of 
the Federal Court Appellate System, popularly known as the Hruska 
Commission for its chair, Senator Roman Hruska (R-Neb.).7 After per-
forming a thorough analysis, the Hruska Commission recommended that 
Congress bifurcate the two biggest courts, the Fifth and the Ninth Cir-
cuits, instead of championing a more comprehensive resolution, such as 
realigning the entire appellate system.s Congress also split the Fifth Cir-
cuit because it was large and the court's active judges favored division;9 
however, bifurcation failed to relieve overloaded dockets.10 
Numerous observers had suggested the Ninth Circuit's division since 
the 1940s.11 Therefore, the Hruska Commission's bifurcation recommen-
dation was predictable, even if its suggestion that Congress split Califor-
nia and reassign its districts to different circuits was surprising.12 The 
proposal respecting California was quite controversial and delayed seri-
ous congressional examination of the court's division in 1973. Moreover, 
Congress showed little interest in a circuit-splitting measure that was in-
troduced a decade later.13 
5. In 1929, crowded dockets led Congress to create the Tenth Circuit by detaching 
Colorado, Kansas, New Mexico, Oklahoma, Utah, and Wyoming from the Eighth Circuit 
and retaining Arkansas, Iowa, Minnesota, Missouri, Nebraska, North Dakota, and South 
Dakota in the Eighth Circuit. See Act of Feb. 28, 1929, ch. 363, 45 Stat. 1346, 1347 (current 
version at 28 U.S.C. § 41 (1994)). 
6. Act of Oct. 14, 1980, Pub. L. No. 96-452, 94 Stat. 1994 (current version at 28 U.S.C. 
§ 41 (1994)); see also Charles A. Wright, The Overloaded Fifth Circuit: A Crisis in Judicial 
Administration, 42 TEx. L. REv. 949 (1964) (discussing caseload congestion). See generally 
H.R. REP. No. 1390, 96th Cong., 2d Sess. (1980), reprinted in 1980 U.S.C.C.A.N. 4236; 
Baker, Redrawing, supra note 1, at 924-28. 
7. Commission on Revision of the Federal Court Appellate System, The Geographi-
cal Boundaries of the Several Judicial Circuits: Recommendations for Change, 62 F.R.D. 
223 (1973) [hereinafter Hruska Commission]. 
8. See Hruska Commission, supra note 7, at 228. 
9. See Baker, Redrawing, supra note 1, at 927; see also Letter from Charles E. Wig-
gins, U.S. Circuit Judge for the Ninth Circuit, to Sen. Dianne Feinstein (Dec. 18, 1995) (on 
file with author) [hereinafter Wiggins Letter]. 
10. See OFFICE OF THE CIRCUIT EXECUTIVE OF THE U.S. CouRTS FOR THE NINTH 
CIRCUIT, POSITION PAPER IN OPPOSITION TO S. 956-NINTH CIRCUIT CoURT OF APPEALS 
REORGANIZATION Acr OF 1995 (June 22, 1995), reprinted in 141 CONG. REc. Sl0,436, 
Sl0,436-38 (daily ed. July 20, 1995) (statement of Sen. Murray) [hereinafter S. 956 PosI-
TION PAPER). 
11. See Baker, Redrawing, supra note 1, at 928; S. 956 POSITION PAPER, supra note 10, 
at 2; see also OFFICE OF THE CIRCUIT EXECUTIVE OF THE U.S. COURTS FOR THE NINTH 
CIRCUIT, POSITION PAPER IN OPPOSITION TO s. 1686 NINTH CIRCUIT COURT OF APPEALS 
REORGANIZATION Acr (Aug. 2, 1991) [hereinafter s. 1686 POSITION PAPER]. 
12. See Hruska Commission, supra note 7, at 234-35. See generally Arthur D. 
Hellman, Legal Problems of Dividing a State Between Federal Judicial Circuits, 122 U. PA. 
L. REv. 1188 (1974). 
13. See S. 1156, 98th Cong., 1st Sess. (1983); Foye A. Silas, Circuit Breaker-Move on 
to Split the Ninth, 10 A.B.A. J. 34, 34 (1984); see also Baker, Redrawing, supra note 1, at 
928; Wiggins Letter, supra note 9. 
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During 1978, Congress empowered circuits of greater than fifteen ac-
tive members to reorganize with administrative units and adopt stream-
lined measures for en bane hearings.14 The Ninth Circuit responded to 
this invitation creatively, reorganizing into three units to achieve more 
efficient administration.15 The court also instituted a limited en bane pro-
cedure whereby the chief judge and ten active judges selected by lot re-
hear en bane appeals on a majority vote of all active judges.16 The court 
has implemented many intramural reforms, such as pre-briefing confer-
ences, 17 and has relied heavily on technological advances.18 In 1989, the 
Ninth Circuit reported to Congress that this experimentation had allowed 
the court to resolve a large, complex docket and that there was no reason 
to split the court. The circuit also reported that the mechanisms used 
permitted the court's continued growth.19 
Senate Bill 948 deserves brief analysis because the measure and most 
arguments espousing it resemble Senate Bill 956 and the contentions 
favoring it. During March 1990, a Senate Judiciary subcommittee held a 
hearing in which many of the bill's champions and opponents offered 
much helpful information.20 Numerous proponents claimed that the 
Ninth Circuit's size fostered complications.21 The "increasing likelihood 
of intracircuit conflicts"22 also bothered advocates of Senate Bill 948, who 
14. Act of Oct. 20, 1978, Pub. L. No. 95-486, § 6, 92 Stat. 1629, 1633 (supplemented by 
Judicial Council's Reform and Judicial Conduct and Disability Act of 1980, Pub. L. No. 96-
458, 94 Stat. 2035 (1981)). 
15. See Baker, Redrawing, supra note 1, at 929. See generally JOSEPH S. CECIL, FED-
ERAL JUDICIAL CENTER, ADMINISTRATION OF JUSTICE IN A LARGE APPELLATE COURT: 
THE NINTH CIRCUIT INNOVATIONS PROJECT (1985); OFFICE OF THE CIRCUIT EXECUTIVE 
OF THE U.S. COURTS FOR THE NINTH 0RCUIT, S. 948 POSITION PAPER NINTH 0RCUIT 
COURT OF APPEALS REORGANIZATION ACT 6-7 (1989) [hereinafter s. 948 PosmoN 
PAPER). 
16. See 9TH CIR. R. 35-3 (formerly 9TH CIR. R. 25). See generally PAUL D. CAR-
RINGTON ET AL., JUSTICE ON APPEAL 161-63, 200-03 (1976); Steven Bennett & Christine 
Pembroke, "Mini" In Banc Proceedings: A Survey of Circuit Practices, 34 CLEv. ST. L. 
REV. 531 (1986). 
17. See Baker, Redrawing, supra note 1, at 932; John B. Oakley, The Screening of 
Appeals: The Ninth Circuit's Experience in the Eighties and Innovations for the Nineties, 
1991 B.Y.U. L. REV. 859. 
18. See Baker, Redrawing, supra note 1, at 932; Arthur D. Hellman, Central Staff in 
Appellate Courts: The Experience of the Ninth Circuit, 68 CAL. L. REv. 937, 961 (1980); S. 
956 POSITION PAPER, supra note 10, at 4. 
19. THE JUDICIAL COUNCIL AND UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE NINTH 
CIRCUIT, FOURTH BIENNIAL REPORT TO CONGRESS ON THE IMPLEMENTATION OF SECTION 
6 OF THE OMNIBUS JUDGESHIPS ACT OF 1978 AND OTHER MEASURES TO IMPROVE THE 
ADMINISTRATION OF JUSTICE IN THE NINTH CIRCUIT 1 (July 1989). See generally s. 948 
PosmoN PAPER, supra note 15, at 6-7. 
20. The Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals Reorganization Act of 1989: Hearing Before 
the Subcomm. on Courts and Admin. Practice of the Senate Comm. on the Judiciary on S. 
948, lOlst Cong., 2d Sess. {1990) [hereinafter S. 948 Hearing]. 
21. These involved geography, the travel and corresponding costs entailed, the popula-
tion served, the number of judgeships, the court's docket, the time for processing appeals, 
and the operating expenses. For helpful overviews of the issues that size implicates, see 
Baker, Redrawing, supra note 1, at 934-38; S. 956 PosmoN PAPER, supra note 10, at 3-5; 
see also Tobias, supra note 1, at 1366-69 (affording discussion of size). 
22. See 135 CONG. REc. S5026 (daily ed. May 9, 1989) (statement of Sen. Gorton); id. 
at S5027 (statement of Sen. Hatfield). 
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observed that the opportunities for conflicts on a court with twenty-eight 
judges are great because 3276 combinations of panels might decide a 
question.23 Several sponsors provided ideas from a northwestern re-
gional viewpoint that evinced different degrees of concern about Califor-
nia. For example, Senator Slade Gorton (R-Wash.), who has led the fight 
to split the court, stated that "California judges and California attitudes" 
strongly dominate litigants in the Pacific Northwest.24 
The Ninth Circuit Judicial Conference, with nearly all of its active 
judges opposing bifurcation, officially suggested that Congress reject any 
proposal for bifurcating the court during its 1989 annual meeting.2s Sen-
ate Bill 948's champions apparently did not carry the burden of persua-
sion that the court's boundaries needed change, while the measure's 
opponents seemed to counter effectively the proponents' arguments.26 
The Senate Judiciary Committee refused to send the circuit-dividing pro-
posal to the floor during 1990.27 The opposition of the court's members, 
of the Senators from the affected states, and of environmental groups and 
the recommendation of the Federal Courts Study Committee that Con-
gress authorize a comprehensive circuit study apparently explain Con-
gress's decision.2s 
A few developments which are relevant to dividing the Ninth Circuit 
occurred in the 1990s. Circuit-splitting bills were introduced;29 however, 
Congress did not seriously consider the bills or authorize an official study 
of the type that the Study Committee envisioned.30 The Federal Judicial 
Center (FJC) concluded a 1993 analysis of structural measures but found 
minimal evidence suggesting that intracircuit inconsistency is a major dif-
ficulty or that it strongly correlates with circuit size.31 The FJC stated 
that the appeals courts were experiencing stress which structural change 
would not "significantly alleviate."32 The Long Range Planning Commit-
tee of the Judicial Conference also broadly assessed the federal courts 
and issued a March 1995 report in which it strongly opposed circuit 
23. See Baker, Redrawing, supra note 1, at 938. 
24. See 135 CONG. REc. S5026 {daily ed. May 9, 1989) (statement of Sen. Gorton). 
Accord 135 CONG. REc. S5028 {daily ed. May 9, 1989) (statement of Sen. Bums). 
25. See S. 1686 PosmoN PAPER, supra note 11, at 2; see also S. 956 PosmoN PAPER, 
supra note 10, at 3. 
26. See, e.g., S. 948 Hearing, supra note 20; S. 948 PosmoN PAPER, supra note 15. See 
generally Baker, Redrawing, supra note 1, at 934. 
27. See S. 1686 PosmoN PAPER, supra note 11, at 8-9; S. 956 PosmoN PAPER, supra 
note 10, at 2. See generally Steve Albert, Congress Weighs Plan to Divide the 9th Circuit, 
LEGAL TIMES, Feb. 1, 1993, at 12. 
28. See REPORT OF THE FEDERAL CouRTS STUDY COMMITTEE 109 (1990). The Com-
mittee was an independent entity that Congress authorized to study the federal courts and 
make recommendations for improving them. See Federal Courts Study Act, Pub. L. No. 
100-702, §§ 101-109, 102 Stat. 4642, 4644 {1994). 
29. See S. 1686, 102d Cong., 1st Sess. (1991); H.R. 3654, 103d Cong., 1st Sess. {1993). 
30. See supra text accompanying note 28. 
31. JUDITH A. MCKENNA, FEDERAL JUDICIAL CENTER, STRUCTURAL AND OTHER 
ALTERNATIVES FOR THE FEDERAL COURTS OF APPEALS 94 {1993). 
32. See id. at 155. 
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restructuring. 33 
IL ANALYSIS OF SENATE BILL 956 
A. DESCRIPTIVE ANALYSIS OF SENATE BILL 956 
Senate Bill 956 modifies Senate Bill 948 in only two significant ways.34 
The major changes are the states that would comprise, and the active 
judges who would be authorized for, the Ninth and 1\velfth Circuits. Sen-
ate Bill 956 differs from Senate Bill 948 by leaving Hawaii, Guam, and the 
Northern Mariana Islands in the proposed Ninth Circuit and including 
Arizona and Nevada in the new 1\velfth Circuit, and by assigning thir-
teen, rather than nine, judges to the new court.35 
The Senate Judiciary Committee held a September 1995 hearing on 
Senate Bill 956 which yielded little information that had not been ad-
duced on Senate Bill 948 in 1990. A partial exception was Ninth Circuit 
Judge Diarmuid F. O'Scannlain. Judge O'Scannlain was probably the 
court's first active judge to endorse publicly the idea of splitting the Ninth 
Circuit. He explored the possibilities of the existing court's trifurcation, 
of a realignment analogous to Senate Bill 956's most recent iteration, and 
of California's division.36 Senator Howell Heflin (D-Ala.) also called for 
a "careful evaluation of the entire circuit court structure and the adminis-
tration of justice. "37 
During a December Judiciary Committee markup, the Committee ap-
proved a substitute measure which would place Arizona and Nevada in 
the proposed Twelfth Circuit, authorize thirteen judges for the court, and 
locate the court's headquarters in Phoenix.38 With the exception of Sena-
tor Heflin, Committee members voted 11-7 along party lines.39 Senator 
33. COMMITTEE ON LoNG RANGE PLANNING OF THE JUDICIAL CONFERENCE OF THE 
UNITED STATES, PROPOSED LoNG RANGE PLAN FOR THE FEDERAL COURTS 42, 123-24 
(1995) [hereinafter LONG RANGE PLAN). 
34. For example, the provisions that prescribe the places where circuit court is held, 
the assignment of active judges and senior judges' election of assignment, the seniority of 
judges, as well as the measure's application to cases and its effective date, definitions, and 
administration are the same or analogous. Compare S. 948, 101st Cong., 1st Sess. §§ 2-3 
(1989) with S. 956, 104th Cong., 1st Sess. §§ 2-3 (1995). 
35. Compare S. 948, 101st Cong., 1st Sess. (1989) with S. 956, 104th Cong., 1st Sess. 
(1995). An earlier measure had prescribed seven judges for the projected Twelfth Circuit. 
See S. 853, 104th Cong., 1st Sess. (1995). Moreover, Senate Bill 956 originally placed Ari-
zona and Nevada in the proposed Ninth Circuit. See Tobias, supra note 1, at 1412-13. 
36. The Ninth Circuit Split: Hearings on S. 956 Before the Senate Committee on the 
Judiciary, 104th Cong., 1st Sess. (1995) (statement of Diarmuid F. O'Scannlain, U.S. Cir-
cuit Judge for the Ninth Circuit) [hereinafter S. 956 Hearings). Those ideas were not new, 
as the Hruska Commission had examined them in 1973. See Hruska Commission, supra 
note 7, at 235-39. 
37. S. 956 Hearings, supra note 36; see also S. REP. No. 197, Ninth Circuit Court of 
Appeals Reorganization Act of 1995, 104th Cong., 1st Sess. (1995) [hereinafter Senate 
Report). 
38. See S. 956, 104th Cong., 1st Sess. (1995); SENATE JuDICIARY COMMITTEE, 104TH 
CoNG., 1ST SESS., MARKUP OF s. 956 (Dec. 7, 1995) [hereinafter DECEMBER 7 MARKUP]; 
see also Adrianne Flynn, Senate Panel OKs New Appeals Court; Circuit Would Be Based in 
Phoenix, ARIZ. REPUBLIC, Dec. 8, 1995, at Bl. 
39. See DECEMBER 7 MARKUP, supra note 38; see also Flynn, supra note 38. 
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Orrin Hatch (R-Utah), the Committee chair, announced that his vote was 
partly aimed at encouraging Senator Conrad Burns (R-Mont.) to lift the 
hold which he had placed on all Ninth Circuit nominees in June.4o Sena-
tor Dianne Feinstein (D-Cal.) strongly opposed the bill; however, the 
Committee rejected 8-9 her proposal to create a national study 
commission. 41 
In March 1996, Senate Bill 956's advocates attempted to have the Sen-
ate consider the measure in the context of federal courts appropriations 
legislation.42 Considerable substantive debate on circuit-splitting's merits 
ensued; however, the Bill's proponents concluded that they lacked the 
necessary votes to pass Senate Bill 956. The champions, therefore, 
agreed to a measure that would create a national study commission which 
passed easily with bipartisan support.43 The proposal was assigned to the 
House Subcommittee on Intellectual Property and Judicial Administra-
tion which Representative Carlos Moorhead (R-Cal.) chaired.44 The 
measure remained in that subcommittee until autumn, when several sena-
tors threatened to attach the study commission proposal to court appro-
priations legislation. This led Representative Moorhead to move the 
legislation out of his subcommittee. However, Congress adjourned with-
out passing the measure that would have authorized the study commis-
sion, although it did appropriate funds for the study.45 
B. PROPONENTS' ARGUMENTS FOR SENATE BILL 956 AND RESPONSES 
Senate Bill 956's champions, when introducing the measure and testify-
ing at the hearing, reiterated the three principal concepts articulated for 
Senate Bill 948: size, inconsistency and California domination of the 
Northwest.46 For example, Senator Gorton observed that the Ninth Cir-
cuit is the largest appeals court and that its massive size fosters inconsis-
tency, while stating that California parties file fifty-five percent of the 
circuit's cases, so that "California judges and California judicial philoso-
phy" dominate litigants in the Pacific Northwest.47 The proponents enun-
ciated a few new ideas which were variations on the concepts above. 
40. See SENATE JumCIARY COMMITTEE, 104TH CONG., lsT SESs., MARKUP OF S. 956 
(Nov. 30, 1995); Howard Mintz, Time of the Essence for Clinton's Judicial Nominees, THE 
REcoRDER, Aug. 1, 1995, at 1. 
41. See DECEMBER 7 MARKUP, supra note 38; see also Flynn, supra note 38. In March, 
1996, the Senate authorized a commission. See 142 CONG. REc. S2544-45 (daily ed. Mar. 
20, 1996). Congress appropriated funding for the Commission but failed to authorize it. 
See H.R. REP. No. 104-863, 104th Cong., 2nd Sess. (1996), reprinted in 142 CONG. REc. 
Hll,6444, 11,859 (Sept. 28, 1996). 
42. 142 CoNG. REc. S2219-2303 (Mar. 18, 1996); see also Carl Tobias, A Proposal to 
Study the Federal Appellate System, 167 F.R.D. 275, 279 (1996). 
43. See 142 CoNG. REc. S2544-45 (daily ed. Mar. 20, 1996). 
44. I rely in this sentence and in the remainder of this paragraph on conversations with 
numerous individuals who are familiar with the developments that transpired. 
45. See 142 CoNG. REc. Hll,859 (daily ed. Sept. 28, 1996). 
46. See supra notes 20-24 and accompanying text. 
47. 141 CoNG. REc. S7504 (daily ed. May 25, 1995) (statement of Sen. Gorton) [here-
inafter Gorton Statement]. Accord 141 CoNG. REc. S7505-06 (daily ed. May 25, 1995) 
· (statement of Sen. Burns) [hereinafter Burns Statement]. 
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Senator Gorton claimed that the court is presently the "slowest of 12 re-
gional circuits in hearing and deciding appeals, on average taking a full 16 
months" and that the "number of pending cases swelled by almost 20 
percent in the last year."48 The average processing time and the pending 
appeals are rather problematic; however, the additional 1.5 months is 
comparatively small, both figures may fluctuate, and the circuit lacked a 
complete contingent of active judges in the applicable period. Moreover, 
the "average time from oral argument submission to disposition-that is, 
the actual time the judges have the cases in their hands-is 1.9 months, or 
.5 months less than the national average. "49 
Senator Burns contended that the court's bifurcation would "bring 
much needed caseload relief to the Ninth Circuit while providing overall 
relief to states like my own Montana."50 These assertions appear plausi-
ble, but scrutiny shows that they leave much pertinent material unsaid. 
The proposed Ninth Circuit would receive fewer filings in an absolute 
sense than the existing Ninth Circuit. This reduction will offer no actual 
advantage and could be deleterious. Senate Bill 956, by authorizing fif-
teen active judges, affords a ratio of three-judge panels per appeal, which 
is considerably less beneficial than the ratio that the current court has and 
which would be substantially less favorable than the new 1\velfth Circuit. 
Senate Bill 956's judicial assignments would significantly increase 
caseloads in the projected Ninth Circuit from 868 to 1065 appeals per 
three-judge panel annually.s1 This contrasts markedly with the approxi-
mately 765 appeals that judges on the new Twelfth Circuit would face.52 
These statistics indicate that the proposed Ninth Circuit will realize no 
true caseload relief and that states in the new Twelfth Circuit will secure 
relief, but at the projected Ninth Circuit's expense. 
The above material demonstrates that the Ninth Circuit's division will 
afford the proposed 1\velfth Circuit a measure of relief. 53 This benefit 
may be rather expensive and could be delayed at least in the near fu-
ture.54 Any endeavor as substantial as establishing a new circuit will ex-
perience a number of start-up and permanent costs. For instance, the 
48. Gorton Statement, supra note 47, at S7504. Accord Bums Statement, supra note 
47, at S7506. 
49. See S. 956 PosmoN PAPER, supra note 10, at 5-6 (emphasis added). 
50. See Bums Statement, supra note 47, at S7506. 
51. See OFFICE OF THE ORCUIT EXECUTIVE OF THE U.S. COURTS FOR THE NINTH 
CIRCUIT, POSITION PAPER IN OPPOSITION TO S. 956-NINTH CIRCUIT COURT OF APPEALS 
REORGANIZATION Acr OF JULY 27, 1995 AND COMPANION BILL H.R. 2935 1, 3 (Feb. 1, 
1996) [hereinafter SECONDS. 956 POSITION PAPER]; Telephone Interview with Mark Men-
denhall, Assistant Circuit Executive for Communications, U.S. Courts for the Ninth Circuit 
(Dec. 20, 1995) [hereinafter Interview]; see also S. 956 PosITION PAPER, supra note 10, at 6-
7 (affording figure of 1014 appeals for Ninth Circuit initially proposed in Senate Bill 956). 
52. See Interview, supra note 51; see also S. 956 PosITION PAPER, supra note 10, at 6 
(affording figure of 645 appeals for 1\velfth Circuit initially proposed in Senate Bill 956). 
The proposed Ninth Circuit would also treat a more complicated, time-intensive docket 
than the existing Ninth Circuit does or the new 1\velfth Circuit would. Id. 
53. See supra notes 50-52 and accompanying text. 
54. s. 948 POSITION p APER, supra note 15, at 12-13; s. 956 POSITION p APER, supra note 
10, at 2-3. 
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projected 1\velfth Circuit must expend time and money on creating and 
maintaining Clerk of Court and Circuit Executive Offices and on training 
court administrative staff, who must acquire an understanding of other 
circuits' operations.55 Some judges may find the 1\velfth Circuit's more 
homogenous appellate docket less challenging. The new 1\velfth Circuit 
would also duplicate responsibilities which the larger Ninth Circuit cur-
rently discharges well.56 However, Senator Jon Kyl (R-Az.) suggested 
that certain of these costs would be rather small.57 
The relatively small size of the proposed 1\velfth Circuit could foster 
collegiality. The thirteen judges authorized for the court contrast sharply 
with the twenty-eight members of the existing Ninth Circuit. Thirteen is 
somewhat fewer than the fifteen judges the Judicial Conference recom-
mended constitute the maximum.58 This judicial complement should in-
crease the possibilities for exchange among the court's members. For 
example, every 1\velfth Circuit judge will sit with other members of the 
circuit and labor on Circuit Judicial Council projects more often. The 
enhanced interaction should increase cooperation and productivity in nu-
merous situations, particularly when resolving cases.59 The court's recent 
addition of four more judges, however, undermines the force of the 
collegiality idea because it will simply limit the opportunities for 
interchange. 
55. See Senate Report, supra note 37, at 24-25. After the nascent TWelfth Circuit is 
formed and has solved the essential difficulties implicating its creation, the court will expe-
rience foreseeable and unpredictable problems. For example, the circuit's administrative 
personnel must comprehend the court's docket, while the circuit's judges will have to sit 
more often on panels with identical colleagues and resolve promptly a modified case mix. 
But see id. at 6. 
56. Administratively, the creation of a new circuit would require duplicative 
offices of clerk of court, circuit executive, staff attorneys, settlement attor-
neys, and library, as well as courtrooms and mail and computer facilities. In 
addition, approximately 40,000 square feet of new headquarters space would 
be required, all of which would duplicate offices and space in San Francisco. 
Further, a small circuit, with its concomitant small caseload, would under-
utilize judicial resources and reduce the opportunities for efficiencies avail-
able to a larger circuit. 
s. 956 POSITION p APER, supra note 10, at 2. 
57. See DECEMBER 7 MARKUP, supra note 38. 
58. JUDICIAL CoNFERENCE OF THE UNITED STATES, REPORTS OF THE PROCEEDINGS 
OF THE JUDICIAL CoNFERENCE OF THE UNITED STATES 48 (1974). Caseload expansion, 
congressional authorization of 28 judges for the Ninth Circuit, and the former Fifth Cir-
cuit's division probably make this suggestion dated. 
59. See Senate Report, supra note 37, at 9. An appeals court consisting of fewer 
judges might correspondingly eliminate the need to apply certain unusual mechanisms, 
such as the Ninth Circuit's limited en bane technique, which some observers believe is 
rather ineffective. See Baker, Redrawing, supra note 1, at 930; Senator Slade Gorton, Posi-
tion Paper on the "Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals Reorganization Act of 1989" (S. 9:48) 7 
(Mar. 6, 1990), reprinted in S. 948 Hearing, supra note 20, at 24 [hereinafter Gorton Posi-
tion Paper]. But see REPORT OF THE FEDERAL CouRTS STUDY COMMITTEE, supra note 28, 
at 114-15; Judge J. Clifford Wallace, Address at the University of California Law School at 
Berkeley (Dec. 2, 1982), reprinted in John Lateef, Justice on Appeal; A Proposal, L.A. 
DAILY J. REP., Sept. 29, 1989, at 6, 9. 
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C. ADDITIONAL ARGUMENTS AGAINST SENA TE BILL 956 
1. The Limited Strategy of Circuit-Splitting 
The bifurcation of circuits is a limited reform. The numerous, above-
mentioned arguments against Senate Bill 956 deserve limited treatment 
here. Perhaps most important, the proposed Ninth Circuit would have a 
ratio of three-judge panels to cases which will complicate its efforts to 
resolve appeals expeditiously, economically, and fairly.60 Moreover, the 
projected 1\velfth Circuit's establishment could require significant start-
up and permanent expenditures, while some advantages that the new 
1\velfth Circuit realizes would be at the proposed Ninth Circuit's ex-
pense.61 The larger appeals courts, such as the Second and District of 
Columbia Circuits, that experience more problems than the other appel-
late courts, defy feasible division.62 Splitting appeals courts also irrevo-
cably decreases their federalizing role, reducing circuits' responsibility to 
reconcile the Constitution and national policy with state and local policy 
concems.63 Judges and commentators have insisted that mincing appeals 
courts is worse than bifurcating them because the symmetry and few ben-
efits secured would erode the courts' federalizing role and further frag-
ment the fractured law of the circuits.64 
Bifurcating the Ninth Circuit or relying on it as a reason for establish-
ing numerous smaller appellate courts is unwise because each proposition 
ignores the real problem. Dividing circuits does not remedy one court's 
difficulties; it merely defers resolution of two circuits' complications.65 
The solution afforded for the Ninth Circuit thus embodies a much larger 
problem. Distributing that court's current docket between the projected 
Ninth and 1\velfth Circuits will simply shift, not decrease, the workload. 
The total quantity of appeals decided would be the same, regardless of 
the number of courts available to resolve the cases. The big circuits' diffi-
culties primarily result from congressional willingness to authorize addi-
60. See supra notes 51-52 and accompanying text. 
61. See supra notes 53-56 and accompanying text. 
62. See, e.g., Paul D. Carrington, Crowded Dockets and the Courts of Appeals: The 
Threat to the Function of Review and the National Law, 82 HARV. L. REv. 542, 587 (1969); 
Hellman, supra note 12, at 1192-1237. The few benefits and the numerous detriments ac-
companying the former Fifth Circuit's bifurcation demonstrate its ineffectiveness. See Let-
ter from J. Clifford Wallace, Chief U.S. Circuit Judge for the Ninth Circuit, to Sen. Spencer 
Abraham (Dec. 21, 1995) (on file with author) [hereinafter Wallace Letter]; see also supra 
notes 6-10 and accompanying text. But see Senate Report, supra note 37, at 9. 
63. See CHARLES A. WRIGHT, LAW OF FEDERAL COURTS§ 3 (5th ed. 1994); John M. 
Wisdom, Requiem for a Great Court, 26 LoY. L. REv. 787, 788 (1980). Circuit-splitting 
might seem more workable, as a theoretical matter, if Congress redrew at once the bound-
aries of the entire appellate system; however, the initial equalization attained by, for in-
stance, creating 20 circuits of nine judges apiece might be overly disruptive. See Hruska 
Commission, supra note 7, at 228; see also Thomas E. Baker & Douglas D. McFarland, The 
Need for a New National Court, 100 HARV. L. REV. 1400, 1404-09 (1987). 
64. See Baker, Redrawing, supra note 1, at 945-46; Thomas G. Gee, The Imminent 
Destruction of the Fifth Circuit: Or, How not to Deal with a Blossoming Docket, 9 TEx. 
TECH. L. REv. 799, 806 (1978). 
65. See Thomas E. Baker, A Postscript on Precedent in the Divided Fifth Circuit, 36 Sw. 
L.J. 725, 742 (1982). 
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tional judgeships and to enlarge jurisdiction without addressing expanded 
dockets.66 Adding judges and bifurcating circuits has undermined impor-
tant characteristics of the appellate system. For example, the several 
thousand possible three-judge panels that typify the big circuits can com-
plicate rehearing en bane and monitoring of the law, increase the pros-
pects for intracircuit inconsistencies, and strain relationships involving 
judges.67 
The above ideas have prompted some experts to question whether au-
thorizing more judgeships for the current appellate system is appropri-
ate.68 Numerous highly-respected people and institutions have 
challenged the advisability of applying structural approaches to the 
problems confronting circuits.69 A number of persons and organizations 
which are intimately familiar with the Ninth Circuit have stated that the 
court is not encountering complications which require its division.70 
2. The Problems of a One-State Circuit 
Another reason why bifurcation would be unwise is that the proposed 
Ninth Circuit will effectively be a one-state circuit. The last iteration of 
Senate Bill 956 have placed Hawaii, Guam, and the Northern Mariana 
Islands in this court; however, the circuit essentially consists of California, 
66. Alfred T. Goodwin, Splitting the Ninth Circuit-No Answer to Caseload Growth, 
OR. ST. B. BuLL., Jan. 1990, at 10, 11. 
67. See Harry T. Edwards, The Rising Work Load and Perceived "Bureaucracy" of the 
Federal Courts: A Causation-Based Approach to the Search for Appropriate Remedies, 68 
IowA L. REv. 871, 918-19 (1983); Ruth B. Ginsburg, Reflections on the Independence, 
Good Behavior, and Workload of Federal Judges, 55 U. Cow. L. REv. 1, 10-11 (1983). 
68. See Patrick E. Higginbotham, Bureaucracy-the Carcinoma of the Federal Judici-
ary, 31 ALA. L. REv. 261, 270 (1980); see also Lumberman's Mut. Casualty Co. v. Elbert, 
348 U.S. 48, 59 (1954) (Frankfurter, J., concurring); Howell Heflin, Fifth Circuit Court of 
Appeals Reorganization Act of 1980-0verdue Relief for an Overworked Court, 11 CuMB. 
L. REv. 597, 616 (1980). Judge Higginbotham recently chaired the Advisory Committee 
on the Civil Rules. In 1980, Judge Higginbotham observed that congressional addition of 
judges "seemed to be the only positive response to the courts' increasing number of cases 
[but that it] ought to be the last resort, not the first." Higginbotham, supra, at 270. 
69. For example, the Judicial Conference Committee on Long Range Planning re-
cently found circuit restructuring warranted "only if compelling empirical evidence demon-
strates adjudicative or administrative dysfunction in a court so that it cannot continue to 
deliver quality justice and coherent, consistent circuit law in the face of increasing work-
load." LoNG RANGE PLAN, supra note 33, at 42; see also Heflin, supra note 68, at 616. The 
Federal Judicial Center also ascertained in 1993 that the appeals courts were experiencing 
pressure but that it did "not appear to be a stress that would be significantly relieved by 
structural change to the appellate system at this time." McKENNA, supra note 31, at 155. 
70. For instance, Professor Thomas Baker, who recently concluded a comprehensive 
assessment of the appeals courts and who carefully evaluated Senate Bill 948, suggested: 
[T]he strategy of adding judges and dividing circuits simply has been played 
out and is no longer defensible as a long-range plan .... The justifications 
offered so far for dividing the Ninth Circuit simply do not withstand a close 
scrutiny .... Dividing the Ninth Circuit is the least available application of 
the strategy of division [because] [i]t will prove nothing that has not been 
demonstrated repeatedly, most recently at the division of the Fifth Circuit. 
Baker, Redrawing, supra note 1, at 960-61; see also BAKER, RATIONING, supra note 1 (pro-
viding thorough study); Tobias, supra note 1, at 1392-94 (affording similar statements by 
other federal court experts). 
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as that jurisdiction would generate ninety-four percent of the court's ap-
peals and all of the active judges who would serve on the court are pres-
ently stationed in California.71 
The institution of a single-state circuit is effectively unprecedented. 
1\vo large courts, the District of Columbia and Second Circuits, are the 
closest analogues, but the D.C. Circuit differs greatly from the regional 
circuits. The court's location in the seat of the national government and 
the circuit's peculiar jurisdiction and venue mean that the circuit princi-
pally resolves cases challenging federal administrative agency decision-
making. 72 In the Second Circuit, New York does not dominate 
Connecticut and Vermont to the degree that California would probably 
overwhelm Hawaii, Guam, and the Northern Mariana Islands because, 
for example, Connecticut and Vermont account for considerably more 
than six percent of the court's caseload and for six of its thirteen active 
judges.73 
A single-jurisdiction circuit would apparently have numerous detri-
mental impacts. The Hruska Commission asserted that a "one-state cir-
cuit would lack the diversity of background and attitude brought to a 
court by judges who have lived and practiced in different states," charac-
terizing this as a "highly desirable, and perhaps essential, condition" for 
creating circuits,74 and that a single senator who had long tenure and who 
was actively involved in judicial selection could shape the appeals court 
for an entire generation. 75 
3. The Ninth Circuit and Experimentation 
An important systemic disadvantage of dividing the Ninth Circuit 
would be the loss of the best large court for experimenting with proce-
dures which promise to improve the quality of appellate justice. Much of 
the above information shows that the Ninth Circuit has been the ac-
knowledged national leader in testing myriad innovative techniques, in-
volving, for example, pre-briefing conferences and capital punishment 
cases.76 This experimentation will assume critical significance as the 
other appeals courts, with their inexorably expanding dockets, continue 
71. See DECEMBER 7 MARKUP, supra note 38 (statement of Sen. Feinstein). 
72. See Act of June 25, 1948, ch. 646, § 41, 62 Stat. 869, 870 (current version at 28 
U.S.C. § 41 (1994)); see also Spottswood W. Robinson, III, The D.C. Circuit: An Era of 
Change, 55 GEo. WASH. L. REv. 715 (1987); Patricia M. Wald, Life on the District of Co-
lumbia Circuit: Literally and Figuratively Halfway Between the Capital and the White 
House, 72 MINN. L. REV. 1 (1987). 
73. New York is responsible for 87% of the caseload. See Senate Report, supra note 
37, at 29; see also supra note 62 and accompanying text. But see Senate Report, supra note 
37, at 7. 
74. See Hruska Commission, supra note 7, at 237; see also S. 956 PosrTION PAPER, 
supra note 10, at 4 (affording similar ideas regarding diversity in the Ninth Circuit). 
75. See Hruska Commission, supra note 7, at 237; see also id. at 236-37 (rejecting as 
"clearly inferior" suggested realignment identical to Senate Bill 948 except that Arizona 
would be included in the Tenth Circuit). 
76. See supra notes 15-19 and accompanying text. 
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to grow and to resemble more closely the Ninth'Circuit.77 
4. A Closer Look at the Ninth Circuit 
Perhaps the most important difficulty with Senate Bill 956 is that the 
existing Ninth Circuit resists practical bifurcation.78 My recent attempt to 
delineate a feasible reconfiguration showed that the court defies worka-
ble division and that the preferable approach is to leave the circuit in its 
current alignment,79 
The new Ninth Circuit would have few judges to address a large, rela-
tively complex caseload, a situation which will worsen in the future.80 
That court's constitution which Senate Bill 956 envisions, therefore, 
would be less satisfactory than the present court's composition. The lat-
est iteration of the 1\velfth Circuit also entails certain disadvantages. The 
court's creation, nascent existence, and ongoing operation will be expen-
sive. Even some benefits of its establishment might be delayed or be 
costly to attain, while advances which will materialize at the projected 
Ninth Circuit's expense probably do not deserve that characterization. 
Moreover, the thirteen-member court could lack the diversity and flexi-
bility to make special judicial assignments, while it may be too large to 
enhance collegiality. 
No practicable realignment of the present Ninth Circuit apparently re-
mains. One possibility not explored above would be to divide California 
and assign each of its four districts to separate circuits.81 The major diffi-
culty with this approach is that the two courts could interpret California 
law differently. The Hruska Commission minimized the complications of 
77. Former Ninth Circuit Chief Judge James Browning, who spearheaded implementa-
tion of many innovative reforms, summarized most of these ideas: 
The Ninth Circuit is the only remaining laboratory in which to test whether 
the values of a large circuit can be preserved. If we fail, there is no alterna-
tive to fragmentation of the circuits, centralization of administrative author-
ity in Washington, increased conflict in circuit decisions, a growing burden on 
the Supreme Court, and creation of a fourth tier of appellate review in the 
federal system. If we succeed, no further division of circuits will be neces-
sary. Indeed, combining the circuits into four or five might well be feasible-
creating stronger and more effective appellate courts, lightening the burden 
on the Supreme Court, and resulting in a decentralized and more efficient 
administrative system for the federal judicial system. 
Mary M. Schroeder, Jim Browning as a Leader of Judges: A View from a Follower, 21 
ARIZ. ST. L.J. 3, 7 (1989) (quoting Chief Judge James R. Browning). Accord Levin H. 
Campbell, Into the Third Century: Views of the Appellate System from the Federal Courts 
Study Committee, 74 MAss. L. REv. 292, 298 (1989). 
78. See supra notes 65-66 and accompanying text; see also Tobias, supra note 1, at 
1412. 
79. See Tobias, supra note 1, at 1412-15. 
80. See supra notes 51-52 and accompanying text; Tobias, supra note 1, at 1366-69, 
1380-81; see also supra notes 71-75 and accompanying text (suggesting creation of a one-
state circuit consisting of California is unprecedented and has never been seriously consid-
ered apparently because of its disadvantages). 
81. See Tobias, supra note 1, at 1413; see also Hruska Commission, supra note 7, at 
238-39; Hellman, supra note 12, at 1281. 
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inconsistency because the possibility remains in the regional circuits;82 
however, its 1973 proposal that California be split has received minimal 
support.83 
5. Miscellaneous Disadvantages 
Dividing the Ninth Circuit today, by reconfiguring it as Senate Bill 956 
recently proposed, could have other detrimental consequences. Bifurca-
tion might prove premature and wasteful, should Congress subsequently 
choose to pursue one of many approaches that differ from, and are as 
promising as, the practice of creating additional judgeships and dividing 
circuits. For instance, senators and representatives may, and probably 
should, find that they now lack adequate, reliable empirical data to re-
solve definitively the complex, crucial issues posed by the Ninth Circuit's 
bifurcation. If Congress so determines, it could appoint a national study 
commission to ascertain whether mounting appellate dockets are suffi-
ciently problematic to justify treatment and, if so, which remedies seem 
most effective. 
This assessment might show, or Congress, itself, may conclude, that 
growing caseloads are not troubling enough to warrant remediation with 
techniques which are as controversial as circuit-splitting. Were a national 
study to demonstrate, or Congress to discover, that expanding dockets 
cause problems that are sufficiently serious to deserve treatment, senators 
and representatives could consider preferable to circuit-splitting numer-
ous non-structural measures, such as discretionary appellate review or the 
restriction of district courts' original jurisdiction.84 Should Congress de-
cide to adopt structural alternatives, it might find nationally-applicable 
solutions more promising, including the combination of the existing re-
gional circuits into fewer jumbo courts or the further division of the pres-
ent circuits into twenty appellate courts with nine judges each.85 
Even if senators and representatives favored a more localized struc-
tural remedy, they could prefer arrangements other than Senate Bill 956's 
last iteration. For example, Congress might consider better a different 
alignment of the states that now comprise the Ninth Circuit, choosing to 
establish new courts which are more compact, encompass only contiguous 
jurisdictions, or directly address the California conundrum.86 Senators 
and representatives may also wish to fashion circuits by combining some 
states that are in the present Ninth Circuit with states that are in the 
existing Eighth or Tenth Circuits.87 
82. See Hruska Commission, supra note 7, at 238-39. Accord Hellman, supra note 12, 
at 1281. 
83. See supra notes 12-13 and accompanying text. But cf supra note 36 and accompa-
nying text (exploring other possibilities that have not been seriously considered). 
84. See, e.g., BAKER, RATIONING, supra note 1, at 234-38; MCKENNA, supra note 31, at 
123-27; LoNG RANGE PLAN, supra note 33, at 23-37. 
85. See, e.g., J. Clifford Wallace, The Case for Large Federal Courts of Appeal, 77 JUDI-
CATURE 288, 289 (1994). 
86. See supra notes 78-83 and accompanying text. 
87. See Hruska Commission, supra note 7, at 236-37. 
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D. RESOLUTION 
Much of the material above indicates that the quantitative and qualita-
tive detriments of splitting the Ninth Circuit outweigh the benefits and 
that Congress should leave the court intact. More specifically, the pro-
posed Ninth Circuit would have a disadvantageous ratio of three-judge 
panels to cases and would effectively be a one-state circuit, entailing sig-
nificant problems.BB The proposed T\velfth Circuit would enjoy a 
favorable ratio of judges to appeals and other benefits, such as the some-
what greater collegiality of a smaller court. The T\velfth Circuit's creation 
and ongoing operation could be costly, while the realization of certain 
advantages may be delayed, with a number of these gains coming at the 
expense of the projected Ninth Circuit. 
Bifurcation of the Ninth Circuit would also have deleterious conse-
quences for the appellate system. Division will perpetuate, and could re-
inforce, the policy of adding judges and splitting circuits; this is a limited 
technique, the continuation of which may postpone more efficacious re-
form. Bifurcation will eliminate the preeminent court for experimenting 
with promising procedures. Dividing the Ninth Circuit now could also 
prove unnecessary, and even profligate, if Congress then adopted any of 
numerous effective alternatives. 
In sum, the detriments of the Ninth Circuit's bifurcation outweigh the 
benefits realized both for the region covered by the present court and 
nationally. Congress, therefore, properly rejected Senate Bill 956 and 
should now consider several suggestions, primarily the creation of a com-
mission which would assess expanding dockets and appellate courts. 
Ill. SUGGESTIONS FOR THE FUTURE 
The above analysis shows that circuit-splitting is a limited reform and 
that the Ninth Circuit and other courts encounter some phenomena, prin-
cipally implicating caseload increases, which may deserve consideration. 
Many solutions have also been proffered to the problems that growing 
appeals purportedly create. Those remedies require little analysis here as 
they have been canvassed elsewhereB9 and more evaluation seems unnec-
essary, at least until it is clearer that rising dockets pose difficulties which 
are sufficiently problematic to justify application of solutions that are as 
controversial as circuit-splitting. Insofar as expanding caseloads are ere-
88. See supra notes 51-52, 71-75 and accompanying text. 
89. See, e.g., Baker, Redrawing, supra note 1; Tobias, supra note 1, at 1396-1404. The 
remedies include relatively basic reforms that principally implicate appellate structure. 
The Federal Courts Study Committee canvassed five possibilities, such as creation of a new 
appellate level and consolidation of existing circuits. See REPORT OF THE FEDERAL 
CouRTS STUDY CoMMITTEE, supra note 28, at 118-23; see also BAKER, RATIONING, supra 
note 1, at 238-79. Other basic reforms include limiting the number of circuit judges who 
must resolve cases, differentiated appeal management, discretionary appellate review, and 
restricting district courts' original jurisdiction. See Tobias, supra note 1, at 1396-1404. For 
additional analysis of these and other reforms, see BAKER, RATIONING, supra note 1; Mc. 
KENNA, supra note 31; LoNG RANGE PLAN, supra note 33. 
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ating complications which are serious enough to need remediation, it ap-
pears that other courts are experiencing difficulties similar to those of the 
Ninth Circuit and that the problems may require treatment extending be-
yond this court. Therefore, the preferable approach is the establishment 
of a commission to study the circuits. 
A. NATIONAL STUDY 
Congress should authorize a comprehensive, national assessment of the 
appellate system and circuits' caseloads. The numerous evaluations of 
the complications ascribed to increasing dockets and the many solutions 
posited might indicate that the difficulties and possible remedies have re-
ceived sufficient examination and that Congress now ought to decide.90 
The considerable lingering uncertainty about whether those phenom-
ena which observers attribute to mounting caseloads create problems that 
are troubling enough to deserve treatment and, if so, which measures 
might prove most effective, suggests that Congress should prescribe a new 
study. In fact, the Federal Courts Study Committee and Professor Baker 
proposed that a thorough analysis be conducted to ameliorate imperfect 
understanding, while Senator Heflin stated at the September hearing that 
there "needs to be a careful evaluation of the entire circuit court struc-
ture and the administration of justice."91 
The assessment's particulars warrant cursory examination here because 
similar proposals have been explored elsewhere,92 two as recently as the 
March 1996 Senate floor debate and the December 1995 Judiciary Com-
mittee markup.93 The success of the Hruska Commission and the Federal 
Courts Study Committee means that they might function as instructive 
prototypes. Congress should evaluate those efforts to avoid problems 
that they experienced. For example, Congress probably gave the Study 
Committee an overly broad charge which was difficult to complete in a 
year and a half. This proposition indicates that senators and representa-
tives should authorize a full-time professional staff, draft a limited, spe-
cific mandate, and provide the new study group more than eighteen 
months for concluding its task. 
Congress ought to assemble a committee that resembles the Hruska 
90. See Stephen Reinhardt, Surveys Without Solutions: Another Study of the United 
States Courts of Appeals, 73 Tux. L. REv. 1504, 1512 (1995) (reviewing THOMAS E. BAKER, 
RATIONING JUSTICE ON APPEAL: THE PROBLEMS OF THE U.S. CouRTS OF APPEALS 
(1994)). Judge Reinhardt observes that evaluators have performed 10 important studies. 
See id. at 1521 n.33; see also BAKER, RATIONING, supra note 1, at 33-43 (summarizing 10 
studies). 
91. See REPORT OF THE FEDERAL COURTS STUDY CoMMITTEE, supra note 28, at 116-
17; BAKER, RATIONING, supra note 1, at 292-300; S. 956 Hearings, supra note 36 (statement 
of Sen. Heflin). 
92. See BAKER, RATIONING, supra note 1, at 292-300; see also Thomas E. Baker, A 
Proposal That Congress Create a Commission on Federal Court Structure, 14 MISS. C. L. 
REv. 271 (1994); Tobias, supra note 1, at 1407. 
93. See supra notes 38-43 and accompanying text. 
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Commission or the Federal Courts Study Committee.94 The commission 
must be comprised of senators and representatives, preferably ones who 
serve on the respective Judiciary Committees, federal judges, and Execu-
tive Branch officials, and should probably include representatives of state 
governments, the practicing bar, and law schools. The chair might be a 
senator or representative or a federal judge, such as a Supreme Court 
Justice. Congress needs to allocate sufficient funding for travel, hearings, 
and a committee staff of full-time professionals. Most of these individuals 
should possess applicable expertise, relating to the collection, analysis, 
and synthesis of data which involve demographic trends and future de-
mands that the federal civil and criminal justice systems will encounter. 
· The entity and its personnel should be diverse, particularly in terms of 
their views on the federal courts.95 The commission must encourage full 
participation in its activities of interested people and institutions. The 
committee should seek the help of numerous public and private entities, 
including the Judiciary Committees, the Administrative Office of the 
United States Courts, the American Bar Association, and the National 
Center for State Courts, which have much relevant experience and mate-
rial respecting the federal court system.96 
Congress must ask that the commission identify, as precisely as possi-
ble, the phenomena which can be ascribed to growing circuit caseloads 
and determine whether they are sufficiently troubling to justify treatment, 
and, if so, with what measures. Should the committee find that remedia-
tion is necessary, it then ought to analyze the efficacy, including the bene-
fits and detriments, of the possible solutions. The entity might next 
explore potential reforms and develop criteria for congressional 
consideration.97 
After the Senate and the House of Representatives receive the com-
mission's suggestions, Congress must evaluate those recommendations 
and draft proposed legislation that embodies the best approaches.98 
Once the Senate and House hold hearings on these possibilities, Congress 
should be able to agree on the most felicitous mechanisms for treating the 
problems ~ttributable to expanding appeals court dockets.99 
94. See Hruska Commission, supra note 7; REPORT OF THE FEDERAL CouRTS STUDY 
COMMITTEE, supra note 28. See BAKER, RATIONING, supra note 1, at 295-99. 
95. See BAKER, RATIONING, supra note 1, at 297. 
96. This list is obviously not exhaustive. See also BAKER, RATIONING, supra note 1, at 
295-96 (affording additional suggestions). The entity should rely on states' experiences in 
refonning their appellate systems. See id. at 298. See generally DANIEL J. MEADOR, AP· 
PELLATE COURTS: STAFF AND PROCESS IN THE CRISIS OF VOLUME (1974) (discussing enti-
ties which could assist such a committee). 
97. See BAKER, RATIONING, supra note 1, at 297. 
98. See BAKER, RATIONING, supra note 1, at 296. See generally FRANKFURTER & LAN-
DIS, supra note 2, at 107. 
99. A modest approach that Congress might prescribe is additional experimentation 
that seeks to ameliorate the complications faced by circuits. See Tobias, supra note 1, at 
1405-07. 
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B. IMPROVEMENTS IN SENATE BILL 956 
Much material above suggests the inadvisability of splitting the Ninth 
Circuit and of enacting Senate Bill 956.100 Were Congress to find this 
information unpersuasive and seriously examine a proposal analogous to 
Senate Bill 956, however, it must consider improving the measure, at least 
by authorizing adequate resources so that the new Ninth and 1\velfth Cir-
cuits can fulfill their duties. 
The most recent iteration of Senate Bill 956 assigns fifteen judges to 
the projected Ninth Circuit and thirteen judges to the new 1\velfth Cir-
cuit.101 Many factors, such as identifying exactly how many appeals the 
two courts will receive, make it difficult to specify the precise number of 
judges who should sit on the respective circuits. Certain applicable mate-
rial permits relatively reliable approximations. Perhaps most relevant, 
mounting workloads led the Ninth Circuit to seek ten additional judges in 
1992, and the Judicial Conference asked that Congress authorize those 
positions during 1993.102 Estimates can also be posited by consulting re-
cent data implicating the number, complexity, and disposition rates of 
cases appealed from the projected circuits' district courts, by allowing for 
applicable variables, and by extrapolating into the future.103 The approx-
imations indicate that Senate Bill 956 will require the new Ninth Circuit 
to address a bigger, more complex docket with proportionately fewer 
judges than the present Ninth, or the proposed 1\velfth, Circuit.104 
These propositions, especially the ratio of three-judge panels to cases, 
show that Congress should approve at least ten more judges for the two 
projected circuits. Congress ought to assign a majority of the judges to 
the proposed Ninth Circuit, 105 authorizing some one and a half times as 
many judges for this court as the projected 1\velfth Circuit.106 Should 
100. In fact, the strength of the evidence that favors keeping the court intact practically 
convinced me to afford no suggestions for improving the circuit-dividing proposal. My 
concern was that my recommendations would be viewed as an endorsement of a concept I 
believe to be faulty. 
101. See S. 956, 104th Cong., 1st Sess. (1995); see also DECEMBER 7 MARKUP, supra 
note 38. 
102. See Albert, supra note 27; see also Wallace Letter, supra note 62. 
103. Indeed, Senator Gorton acknowledged a half-decade ago that the circuit's docket 
would have justified adding 10 more judgeships. See Gorton Position Paper, supra note 59, 
at 2. . 
104. See supra notes 51-52 and accompanying text. Moreover, foreseeable and unpre-
dictable complications may accompany the new courts' establishment and nascent 
existence. 
105. The 10 judges and their allocation are approximations that I based primarily on the 
Executive Office data and the Ninth Circuit and Judicial Conference requests. The re-
quests are probably dated, given caseload increases. See supra notes 51-52, 102 and accom-
panying text. Indeed, Congress might assign most of the judges suggested to the new Ninth 
Circuit, in light of the small and less complex docket that the new Twelfth Circuit will have 
and the potential it has for underutilizing its judicial resources. See supra notes 56, 58-59 
and accompanying text. 
106. The multiplier is an approximation which I based primarily on the Executive Of-
fice data. See supra notes 51-52 and accompanying text. If Congress approves no new 
judges for the proposed courts, it should consider allocating judges between the courts in 
accordance with the multiplier. 
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Congress reject these suggestions, it ought to create enough new judge-
ships and allocate them so that the two courts can efficaciously discharge 
their responsibilities.101 
Were Congress to consider seriously a new version of Senate Bill 956, it 
should prescribe the best composition of each proposed circuit. The 
problem with constituting the projected courts is that the present Ninth 
Circuit defies feasible division. My effort to identify a practicable realign-
ment indicates that the court resists workable bifurcation.108 Congress, 
therefore, should leave the circuit in its existing configuration. 
IV. CONCLUSION 
The proposal for splitting the Ninth Circuit that the second session of 
the 104th Congress considered would have minimally improved the 
court's division which was first proffered; however, the recent recommen-
dation would prove more detrimental than beneficial for the proposed 
Ninth Circuit and for the appellate system. Congress, accordingly, should 
leave the Ninth Circuit intact to continue performing a vital function as 
. the premier appeals court for experimenting with efficacious procedures 
while simultaneously allocating the requisite resources for the court to 
operate effectively. Congress must seriously consider creating a commis-
sion, modeled on the Hruska Commission and the Federal Courts Study 
Committee, which would ascertain whether the phenomena that can be 
ascribed to docket growth pose sufficient difficulty to warrant treatment, 
and, if so, what solutions are most promising. 
107. The polestar which Congress should employ and which I have used is the effective 
discharge of judicial duties. Similar factors apply to allocation of other resources, such as 
the Circuit Executive Office. 
108. See Tobias, supra note 1, at 1412-15; see also supra notes 78-83 and accompanying 
text. 
